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Abstract
This paper examines the disconnect between the literature on and practice of legality verification
(LV) in the forest sector and what would seem to be a logical extension into the literature on and
responses to forest crime and, more specifically, transnational criminality associated with the
trade in illegally logged timber. The apparently logical overlap between these two areas of
endeavour arises because both are dealing with aspects of supply chains or chains of custody
involving raw timber, forest products or timber products more generally. The disconnect, I
suggest here, arises because of a lack of ‘joined up thinking’ between the two themes that are
central to forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) - that is, enforcement on the one
hand and governance on the other. The former is frequently perceived to be relevant mainly to
issues of criminality and the development of coercive responses by the state, the latter to
normative standards and rules for defining legality and implementing verification in which actors
other than the state have assumed a substantial role. The second purpose of this paper, then, is
to explore the role of ‘agents beyond the state’ in the spaces of transnational legality verification
and forest law enforcement. It does so as an initial response to the call from Biermann et al ‘to
document these various forms of governance through which actors exercise agency [beyond the
state] and … to better understand the conditions for the emergence of agency at different levels
and within different architectures.’
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JEL classification: D18; F02; K32; K33; M14; L31
1

Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia: Lorraine.Elliott@anu.edu.au

Legality, criminality and agency beyond the state: forest governance, illegal logging and
associated trade 2
Lorraine Elliott
Introduction
The University of Oxford’s Environmental Change Institute defines forest governance as the
way that ‘state and non-state institutions and actors shape decisions about the conservation and
use of forest resources’. 3 This paper does two things – admittedly both in a preliminary, ‘work in
progress’ fashion – in an exploration of the way that legality, illegality and criminality feature in
those decisions and practices of forest governance. First, it examines the apparent disconnect
between the literature on legality verification (LV) in the forest sector and what would seem to
be a logical extension into the literature on forest crime and, more specifically, criminality. It is
notable that issues of criminality and law enforcement are rarely mentioned in the growing body
of work on legality verification, most of which emanates from scholars and practitioners working
in an environmental or forest management context. In a similar fashion, the literature on the
criminal aspects of trade associated with illegal logging – what Interpol and UNEP call ‘black
trade’ and which is mainly the purview of the law enforcement and border protection
community of practice – rarely discusses legality verification standards and practices.
The apparently logical overlap between these two areas of endeavour arises because both
are dealing with aspects of supply chains or chains of custody involving raw timber, forest
products or timber products more generally. While approaches to verification have focused on
setting standards that can help to define legality and illegality, they have paid little attention to
countervailing criminal efforts that seek to circumvent and violate domestic and international
norms and challenge the authority of states and other private actors. The disconnect, I suggest
here, may well arise because of a lack of ‘joined up thinking’ between the two themes that are
central to forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) - that is, enforcement on the one

This paper draws on research being undertaken for a three year project funded by the Australian Research Council
under its Linkage Grant program in partnership with the Australian federal Department of Sustainability, Water,
Environment, Population and Communities (DSEWPaC). For more on this project, see Lorraine Elliott ‘Fighting
transnational environmental crime’, Journal of International Affairs, 66(1) (2012): 87-104; Lorraine Elliott (2011)
Transnational Environmental Crime: Applying Network Theory to an Investigation of Illegal Trade, Criminal
Activity and Law Enforcement Responses, Australian National University 2011 (Canberra: Department of
International Relations, 2011); and Lorraine Elliott (forthcoming) ‘Governing the international political economy of
transnational environmental crime’ in Anthony J. Payne and Nicola Phillips (eds) The Handbook of the International
Political Economy of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing; in preparation). An earlier version of this paper
was presented as part of a panel on Legality Verification in Transnational Environmental Governance at the
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, April 2013
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http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/ecodynamics/forestgovernance.php (accessed 22 March 2013).
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hand and governance on the other. The former is frequently perceived to be relevant mainly to
issues of criminality and the development of coercive responses by the state, the latter to
normative standards and rules for defining legality and implementing verification.
This paper also accepts Cashore and Stone’s proposition that single instrument
approaches such as LV are necessary but not sufficient to ‘ameliorate the multi-faceted nature of
forest degradation’. 4 From a policy and regulatory perspective, these challenges require more
than just disrupting illegal supply through strengthening domestic legislation – normative change
– and ensuring that forestry agencies have appropriate skills and technical capacity to enforce
that legislation – material change. This paper argues that the focus on (il)legality and governance
in the global forest sector must be supplemented and complemented with a focus on criminality
and enforcement.
The second purpose of this paper is to explore the role of ‘agents beyond the state’ in the
spaces of transnational legality verification and forest law enforcement. It does so as an initial
response to the call from Biermann et al ‘to document these various forms of governance
through which actors exercise agency [beyond the state] and … to better understand the
conditions for the emergence of agency at different levels and within different architectures.’ 5
This paper focuses not on all non-state actors but specifically on non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) that work independently (beyond the state) as well as with agents of the
state to address governance and enforcement challenges associated with the transnational timber
trade and trafficking. While a role for NGOs has been widely accepted in LV procedures and
standard-setting it has been more controversial in enforcement. This move from verification to
enforcement raises more complex questions about the role of NGOs and ‘agents beyond the
state’.
The lack of a clear international normative framework creates ambiguity about what
constitutes legality and illegality in the global forest sector. This is not helped by the complexity
of forest laws – often numbering in the hundreds – within individual timber producing countries.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to resolve those ambiguities. In the face of
confusion about the substance of what is legal or not, the character of legality is understood here to
apply to behaviour as well as to commodities or goods. 6 Criminal behaviour is often defined in
terms of the active evasion and violation of standards established by domestic and international
Benjamin Cashore and Michael Stone (n.d.) Can legality verification rescue global forest governance? Assessing the interacting
effects of economic mechanisms on forest policy and governance: lessons learned from Southeast Asia, unpublished paper, p. 1
5 Frank Biermann et al (2010) ‘Earth system governance: a research framework’, International Environmental Agreements,
10 (4) 277-98 at pp. 283-4.
6 Penny Green, Tony Ward and Kirsten McConnachie (2007) ‘Logging and legality: environmental crime, civil
society and the state’, Social Justice, 34 (2): 94 – 110.
4
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laws and regulations. This encompasses more than those actions that specifically attract criminal
as opposed to civil or administrative penalties in law. Criminality can also be understood in
sociological terms as deviancy, ‘subject to … social processes of censure and sanction’. 7 In our
transnational environmental crime project, the way we define criminal activities (again, the
character rather than the specific content) is also informed by the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organised Crime. 8 The Convention refers to intentional offences against domestic
(and by extension international) laws that are undertaken with the aim of obtaining financial or
other material benefit. This includes organising, direction, aiding and abetting such offences; or
dealing with the proceeds through money-laundering, or through converting, transferring or
disguising the illicit origins of property that constitutes the proceeds of crime. These kinds of
activities take on a transnational form when, in effect, the planners, the perpetrators, the
products or the profits (I refer to these as the 4 Ps of transnational crime) cross borders. 9
Illicit international trafficking in forest products 10
The transnational trade in illegally logged timber – described by one observer as being of
‘industrial scale’ 11 – is a significant component of what is an otherwise legal, although often
unsustainable global industry. Illegal logging, which takes place in some of the world’s most
vulnerable forests, is an umbrella term for a range of activities: extraction crimes such as logging
without a licence or logging inside protected areas or national parks; transportation crimes
involving the smuggling across borders of illegally logged (or stolen) timber and timber products,
or timber species that are protected from trade under the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES); and processing crimes such as the fraudulent labeling of timber
destined for export (timber laundering). It is a major driver of deforestation, habitat destruction,
and species endangerment and is often accompanied by abuse of human rights, violence, and
social and cultural dislocation for forest dwelling and forest-reliant communities.
While not all illegally logged timber is destined for transnational trade, there is almost
certainly a close relationship between the extent of illegal logging and the extent of timber
trafficking. Illegal logging is reported to account for 50 to 90 percent (by volume) of forest
Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 94.
The Convention’s focus on organized crime (groups that are structured rather than randomly formed) and on
serious crime attracting four years or more deprivation of liberty in domestic law can, however, narrow the scope
and range of what is understood as a crime or as criminality in the global forest sector.
9 Under the UN TOC Convention, the activity must be recognized as a criminal offense in at least two countries as a
result of international or national law
10 This is the phrase used by ECOSOC and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (under
the auspices of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime); see, for example, ECOSOC Resolution 2008/25.
11 Sam Lawson, (2004) Profiting from plunder: how Malaysia smuggles endangered wood (London/Bogor: Environmental
Investigation Agency/Telapak), p. 1.
7
8
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output in tropical producer countries, and between 15 and 30 percent of global output. 12 In
Indonesia, for example, where at its height something between 51 percent and 80 percent of
timber cut was thought to be illegally logged, 13 estimates suggest that the equivalent of 300,000
million cubic metres of illegally harvested timber is smuggled out of the country each month. 14
The illegal timber trade is also sustained by the ease of commodity displacement with
loggers and traffickers turning to new and more profitable timber species – or to manufactured
products – as other species attract (unevenly implemented) protection status under international
or domestic law. This form of TEC is driven in part by a market for cheap timber and timber
products. But the trade also reflects demand for high value species. 500 rosewood logs seized by
Thai Customs in August 2010 were estimated to be worth $US 1.5 million had they reached their
intended Chinese market. 15 Illegally sourced mahogany can fetch more than US$1,700 a cubic
metre. 16 The market might generate profit for timber traffickers but it is costly for governments
and for legitimate industry. The World Bank conservatively estimates the cost to timberproducing countries in lost government revenue at about $US5 billion a year. 17 The trade in
illegally logged timber depresses world timber prices by something between 7 and 16 percent
because the companies and agents involved pay no taxes, fees or other forms of licence and use
cheap and often vulnerable sources of labour. 18
Forest governance and legality verification
The 2008 report of the G8 forest experts agreed that tackling illegal logging and its associated
trade requires combating corruption, strengthening enforcement capacity, re-establishing law
enforcement and administrative systems in post-conflict situations, helping countries to meet
CITES obligations, and enhancing cooperation between customs and law enforcement
authorities in producer and consumer countries. 19 The Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive
Strategies for Global Challenges, adopted at the 12th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice in 2010, recognized emerging forms of crime such as illegal logging that have a
C. Nellemann, , I. Redmond and J. Refisch (2010) The last stand of the gorilla: environmental crime and conflict in the Congo
basin (Norway: UNEP GRID:Arendal), p. 6.
13 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2010) The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime threat
assessment (Vienna: UNODC), p. 167.
14 WWF (n.d.) Country Profile: Indonesia,
http://gftn.panda.org/gftn_worldwide/asia/indonesia_ftn/indonesia_profile/; accessed 17 July 2012
15 Enviromental Investigation Agency (2012) Rosewood robbery (London: EIA), p. 3.
16 Julia M. Urrunaga, Andrea Johnson, Inés Dhaynee Orbegozo and Fiona Mulligan (2012) The laundering machine: how
fraud and corruption in Peru’s concession system are destroying the future of its forests (Washington DC: Environmental
Investigation Agency), p. 3.
17 World Bank (2006) ‘Weak forest governance costs $US 15 billion a year’, Press Release No. 2007/86/SDN. 16
September
18 See Anon (2006) ‘Down in the woods’, The Economist 25 March: 73-5 at p. 74.
19
The G8 Forest Experts’ Report on Illegal Logging, May 2008, pp. 9-11.
12
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significant impact on the environment and called on member states to ‘strengthen their national
crime prevention and criminal justice legislation’ in response.
One of the challenges for governments in meeting these expectations and dealing with
timber trafficking is finding the right regulatory mix across prevention, detection, apprehension,
and prosecution. This is likely to involve the use of economic incentives, command-and-control
strategies and law enforcement practices to contain relationships of exchange along illegal chains
of custody and restrict both supply-side and demand-side activity. The challenges of illegal
logging and associated trade are complex. They flourish in situations of weak governance and
regulation, imperfect or poorly protected property rights, and inadequate legal frameworks for
defining the boundaries of legality and illegality. 20 Put broadly, illegal logging and associated trade
reflect failures in forest governance. Weak forest governance is characterized by corruption,
inadequate or ineffective legal frameworks, and narrow and exclusive decision-making
procedures with little or no transparency or accountability. FAO and the World Bank’s Program
on Forests (PROFOR) define the major elements of ‘good’ forest governance to include
accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, fairness/equity, participation and transparency across
three pillars: policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks; planning and decision-making
processes; and implementation, enforcement and compliance. 21
Measures are required at both the producer and consumer level – to protect forests from
illegal logging and to ensure that timber products that reach the market are or can be certified as
legal (and, often, as from sustainably managed forests). Legality verification has been one strategy
by which governments have sought to meet forest governance challenges. The heart of LV lies in
the elaboration of due diligence processes by which suppliers can ensure the legal status of raw
materials used in the timber and forest products industries. This demands verification of both
legal origin and legal compliance to provide markets with ‘independent information about the
origin of timber’. 22 Suppliers are expected to maintain documented chain of custody systems and
to adopt strategies to enable them to evaluate the risk that illegally logged or sourced timber has
been included in the supply chain. Forest managers, suppliers, and other entities involved in all
stages of a supply chain need to participate if legality verification is to work effectively.
According to NEPCon’s standard legality verification scheme, for material to be determined not
to be associated with illegal activities, it must:

See, for example, Ludgarde Coppens (2013) Transnational environmental crime: a common crime in need of better enforcement,
UNEP Global Environmental Alert Service (GEAS), January.
21 See FAO (2011) Framework for assessing and monitoring forest governance (Rome: FAO/PROFOR).
22 Verifor (2009) Meeting the challenges of timber legality verification (London: Verifor/FAO), p. 3.
20
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•

originate from a forest that has been harvested according to applicable [national]
legislation

•

be transported, traded, and handled legally in the supply chain; and

•

not be mixed with other material of illegal [or uncertain] origin. 23

As well as avoiding timber that is illegally harvested, legal supply chains must also exclude
conflict timber (timber extraction that funds groups involved in conflict situations associated
with human rights abuses or crimes that violate international law including international
humanitarian law). They must also exclude timber from countries that are the subject of
international sanctions, and timber that is logged in ways that violate third party rights including
those of forest-dwellers and local communities. Procedures that must be verified legal along the
supply chain include declaration of species and quantity of timber products for customs,
classification and reporting for appropriate fees and taxes, and the separation of certified timber
from products of unknown or suspicious origin at all stages of transport and trade.
Tracking systems for tracing chains of custody are crucial to legality verification. 24 But
they are auditing not enforcement strategies. They are necessary but not sufficient in the fight
against illegal logging and timber trafficking. While they can play a ‘significant role’ in addressing
the ‘deep-seated problems of forest governance’, relying on LV alone will fail ‘because it does
not address the underlying weaknesses that lead to illegality’. 25 Nor, in many cases, do domestic
legality definitions and practices address fundamental problems associated with illegal chains of
custody and cross-border trade. Investigations into the illegal log trade between Laos and
Vietnam, for example, have revealed that the Certificate of Origin documents identifying Laos as
the country of origin and China as the country of import – documents that would be a required
component of an effective LV scheme – were issued not by Laotian authorities but by the
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the basis of unilateral validation. 26
In contrast to the single-instrument approach, the so-called portfolio approach to forest
governance and the elimination of or reduction in illegal logging and illegal supply anticipates a
combination of instruments that (among other things) involve certification, verification, capacity
building, and voluntary partnership agreements. However this regulatory mix – which captures
policy instruments at a domestic level – is only one component of the ‘systems of [authoritative]
NEPCon Legal Source Standard, Version 1, 8 February 2013, p. 13
Donovan identifies this as only one component of legality verification, and one that is not necessarily included in
all verification initiatives (see Donovan, Private sector forest legality initiatives, p. 14).
25 Verifor, Meeting the challenge, p. 10.
26 Environmental Investigation Agency, Comments on Draft 6 of the “Timber and Timber Product Legality
Definition for the Voluntary Partnership Agreement”, issued in December 2012 by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; available at http://www.eia-international.org/eiacomments-on-the-6th-draft-of-the-vietnamese-timber-and-timber-product-legality-definition
23
24
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rule-making, political coordination and problem-solving’ 27 that constitute and define the reach of
transnational environmental governance. For the most part, these function as the first of the
three FAO pillars referred to above, collectively the policy, legal, institutional and regulatory
frameworks. The focus on governance, legality and verification pays little attention to criminal
practices and behavior, to the illicit forest economy and illegal transnational chains of custody, or
to the role of law enforcement agencies in suppressing, detecting and preventing forest-related
crimes and illegal activities. LV standards and practices are unlikely to be able to address
indiscriminate markets and criminal activity in the forest sector. The Indonesian environmental
NGO WALHI claims that the ‘technical focus on “illegal logging” of the kind that characterizes
LV fails to target the real criminals, those behind the operations’. 28 They argue that it does little
more than ‘legitimise the current system’ which perpetuates deals, perks and the exchange of
large payments to officials and political figures. 29 More attention is therefore demanded of the
areas where ‘criminal law can intervene to protect the environment’. 30
Black trade, criminality and forest law enforcement
The trade in illegally sourced raw timber and forest products has been clearly identified in law
enforcement circles as a form of transnational crime. The chains of custody through which
illegally-sourced or produced commodities are physically sourced and then moved to their
destination can be understood as a form of network. The nodes in the network are designed to
manage illicit trade flows. The links between the nodes consist of relationships of (illegal)
commercial exchange. Some timber trafficking chains are simple, even amateur or opportunistic
attempts that involve a small number of people, uncomplicated smuggling routes, and
unsophisticated forms of concealment. The market networks that underpin or manage the
movement of large quantities of illegally sourced timber are likely to involve multiple sources of
goods, multiple participants in the chain of custody, and the use of sophisticated methods to
conceal either the goods or their true nature or origin. To make detection more difficult, stolen
timber is often moved along complex routes through more than one trans-shipment point where
enforcement is lax and where goods can easily be mixed with legal sources, relabeled or acquire
fraudulent documentation before being moved on.

James N. Rosenau (2002) ‘Governance in a new global order’ in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds) Governing
globalization: power, authority and global governance (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 8
28 Cited in Chantal Marijnissen, Saskia Ozinga, Beatrix Richards and Sebastien Risso (2004) Facing reality: how to halt
the import of illegal timber in the EU (Brussels: FERN/Greenpeace/WWF), p. 8.
29 See Marcus Colchester (2005) ‘Illegal timber in Indonesia: experiments with legal verification’, WRM Bulletin, no.
98, September; http://www.wrm.org.ut/bulletin/98/Indonesia.html
30 Coppens, Transnational environmental crime, p. 5.
27
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Local communities who provide labour for illegal logging and timber processing are
often integrated into criminal networks through patron-client relationships. This may involve
semi-feudal connections to local timber barons or local officials who control aspects of criminal
activity. These relationships can also arise through social coercion that takes advantage of
people’s economic vulnerability in situations where alternative livelihoods are not available. Local
communities are sometimes also ‘bought off’ to minimize protests in areas where resource
extraction is known to be illegal. 31 Transnational environmental crime also creates opportunity
structures for legal companies to engage in shadow enterprise and for front or shell companies
to be used to hide illegal connections and practices. This arises because, in contrast to drugs for
example, illegal timber trade sits alongside a legal one. Black markets, according to Naylor, have
become ‘institutionally embedded in the legal economy’ 32 and, in some sectors at least, legal
businesses use ‘ever shadier methods’. 33 Timber, timber commodities and profits are laundered
with the assistance of delinquent professionals and ‘shadow facilitators’. 34 Environmental goods
and resources are moved in and out of the licit economy through the use of counterfeit or
falsified documentation. Legitimate companies process fraudulent permits and lend their
infrastructure to facilitate transportation in illegal timber.
Intelligence on merbau smuggling syndicates in Southeast Asia shows that they involve
timber brokers in Jakarta, companies and individuals in Malaysia who oversee the actual logging,
companies in Singapore who charter cargo vessels and who arrange false documentation, brokers
in Singapore and Hong Kong who connect sellers in places such as Papua with buyers in India
and China. 35 Timber logged illegally in the Congo Basin, most often under the control of militia
groups, is moved through local front companies to companies in and through Burundi, Rwanda
and Uganda, exported globally to the EU, the Middle East, China and other Asian countries,
with support from financiers in the US. 36
Those engaged in illicit TEC market activity have also moved to take advantage of the
‘upperworld’ of corrupt officials and politicians, enabling them to evade control mechanisms and
protect illegal chains of custody. The correlation between high levels of corruption and illegal

See, for example, the case studies of Cameroon in Danielle Van Oijen and Sylvain Angerand (2007) Illegally logged
wood from Cameroon on the Dutch market (Amsterdam/Paris: Milieudefensie/Les Amis de la Terre).
32 R. T. Naylor (2002) Wages of crime: black markets, illegal finance and the underworld economy (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press), p. 3.
33 Naylor, Wages of crime, p. 4.
34 Douglas Farah (2010) Transnational crime, social networks and forests: using natural resources to finance conflicts and post-conflict
violence (Washington DC: Program on Forests [PROFOR])
35 Julian Newman and Sam Lawson (2005) The last frontier: illegal logging in Papua and China’s massive timber theft
(London/Bogor: Telapak/Environmental Investigation Agency), p. 9.
36 Nellemann et al, The last stand, p. 6.
31
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logging is well documented. 37 Indeed, some commentators suggest that corruption should best
be understood not as a pathology of the state but simply as an instrument of risk management –
a strategy for doing business – for criminal groups. 38 Local officials, customs officers, police and
the judiciary are bribed to overlook illegal shipments, to assist with false paper trails and forged
documentation, to help evidence disappear during prosecutions, to delay or drop prosecutions,
and even to return no convictions when cases are brought to trial. Syndicates running timber
smuggling enterprises in Indonesia, for example, have “bought off local Indonesian customs
officials and harbour masters” and used their influence to “have any attempted shipments by
competitors stopped”. 39
In their most extensive form, timber trafficking networks integrate criminal actors fully
into the economic and political institutions of the state, often delivering them significant power
and even, Serrano suggests, consolidating “exclusive governing authority”. 40 Rather than being
just the recipients of bribes, government officials, protection and enforcement officers, and
politicians can take key roles as the organizers, facilitators and beneficiaries of illicit market
networks. Police and military officers are known to be heavily involved in organizing and
coordinating illegal logging in a number of countries in Southeast Asia or providing security for
logging operations. 41 As with other forms of systematic criminal activity, this bribery and
corruption undermines attempts to instill good governance. They corrode the institutions of the
state and compromise core values such as the rule of law. In the most extreme cases of highlevel corruption and personal patronage, the state itself no longer functions in the Weberian
sense as a provider and guarantor of public goods but as a ‘protection racket’ or kleptocracy that
sustains private appropriation, resource ‘asset stripping’ and rent-seeking.
Disrupting the criminal networks that sustain the illegal timber trade, even those that are
informal and opportunistic, is difficult. The most sophisticated smuggling networks in the illegal
timber trade are often better resourced than law enforcement and border control agencies. While
laws are expected to function on the basis of deterrence – ‘the inhibition of criminal behavior by

See, for example, NEPCon Legal Source Standard, version 1, 8 February 2013; Christian Nellerman/Interpol
Environmental Crime Program (eds) 2012, Green carbon, black trade: illegal logging, tax fraud and laundering in the world’s
tropical forests, A rapid response assessment (Norway: UNEP, GRID-Arendal).
38 Phil Williams (2002) ‘Transnational organized crime and the state’ in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker
(eds) The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 174-5.
39 Lawson, Profiting from plunder, p. 13.
40 Monicá Serrano (2002) ‘Transnational organised crime and international security: business as usual?’ in Mats
Berdal and Monicá Serrano (eds) Transnational organised crime and international security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 18.
41 Rivani Noor and Rully Syumanda (2006) Social conflict and environmental disaster: a report on Asia Pulp and Paper’s
operations in Sumatra, Indonesia (Moreton-in-Marsh, UK: World Rainforest Movement); Marilyne Pereira Goncalves,
Melissa Panjer, Theodore S. Greenberg and William B. Magrath (2012) Justice for forests: improving criminal justice efforts to
combat illegal logging (Washington DC: The World Bank).
37
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fear of the consequences (sanctions or penalties)’ 42 – penalties are often minimal. Intelligence on
activities that sustain the black timber trade is often limited compared with what is known about
other illicit markets such as drugs or arms. Inter-agency arrangements for exchange of
information, for managing joint operations or providing mutual legal and enforcement assistance
are often uneven within countries let alone between them. Enforcement and border protection
agencies require operational support to interdict illegal trade, seize goods, pursue and punish
perpetrators, and use surveillance of corruption, fraud and money-laundering to gather and act
on financial intelligence.
Third parties and agency beyond the state 43
Legality verification and enforcement are assumed to be the responsibility of the state (or states
acting intergovernmentally). Judgements about what is ‘legal’ – for both commodities and actions
– are caught up in definitions and decisions about what is not legal and what is criminal.
Sovereign states claim and seek to retain individual and collective authority over the making and
implementation of rules on trade, crime prevention, enforcement and border protection. States
– or governments, in practice – are central to the form and function of relevant treaty law as
negotiators and as allegedly responsible implementers of that law through domestic legislation
and regulation. Yet the involvement of organized criminal groups brings the monopoly claims of
the sovereign state into conflict with the shadow area of illegality that functions beyond or as a
challenge to sovereign space and authority. Weak states, and those characterized by ‘socioeconomic destitution’, are more likely to offer the kinds of ‘commercial opportunities’ that
attract criminal groups. 44 At the same time, efforts to control borders and to reassert the role of
the state in the face of both licit and illicit market liberalization can have the unintended
consequence of encouraging criminal groups to develop more innovative concealment and
avoidance strategies.
In the terrain of transnational environmental governance, agency for legality verification
and for enforcement has become more complex. NGOs and various forms of enforcement and
intelligence networks have an increasingly important role in verifying not just what is legal in
accordance with regulatory standards but also in exposing what is ‘illegal’ and ‘criminal’ or what
Verifor, Meeting the challenge, p. 6.
The concept of agency beyond the state, in the context of transnational environmental crime including illegal
logging and timber trafficking, also includes the ‘dark side’ of such agency embedded in criminal actors and illicit
market networks. Actors involved in the commission of transnational environmental crime are also in the business
of purposefully violating or subverting the rule systems of global environmental governance and avoiding or
neutralizing regulatory or surveillance schemes by which they are implemented.
44 Achim Wennmann (2004) ‘The political economy of transnational crime and its implications for armed violence in
Georgia’, CP 6: The Illusions of Transition: which perspectives for Central Asia and the Caucasus (Geneva: Graduate Institute
of International Studies/CIMERA), p. 105.
42
43

11

should be defined as such. The concept of agency beyond the state captures the proposition that
non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society organisations do more than protest, advocate,
lobby and advise. 45 Rather in some circumstances – and forest illegality and crime is one such
area – they have become rule-makers, establishing what Bull et al refer to as non-coercive
mechanisms of influence. 46 These can take the form of constitutive rules that define a regime,
regulative rules that focus on procedures, voluntary rules and standards, and codes of conduct
articulated through private regulation, certification and accreditation.
The background of NGO involvement in forest governance – that is the regulatory side
of the equation – is well known. As Donovan notes, organisations in the private (non-public)
sector have taken various leadership roles as independent auditors, sometimes providing ‘direct
fee-for-service to forest product manufacturers, traders or forest managers’ and sometimes
‘contracted by governments or foreign aid organisations in implementing government legality
registration or monitoring systems’. 47 Many of the leading efforts to improve sustainable forest
management through monitoring, certification and the implementation of market-based
mechanisms have been the result of NGO initiatives, sometimes acting alone and sometimes in
partnership with industry groups and sometimes with governments. Private sector/NGO
initiatives in the forest governance arena include the Forest Stewardship Council, the Global
Forest and Trade Network, and the Tropical Forest Trust.
In response to the black trade in timber and forest products (as in other areas of
transnational environmental crime), non-state actors have also become active in rule
implementation and compliance – or what Biersteker and Hall call the ‘enforcement of
contracts’. 48 This might take the form of an inspectorate role and the assessment of compliance,
delivering capacity-building and training, or publicising examples of non-compliance. But it can
also take the form of intelligence, surveillance, and even operational activities.
In the transnational space, nongovernmental organizations and scientific bodies have
become an increasingly important component of the networked and multi-level architecture that
characterizes transnational environmental governance, often as key partners in formal
arrangements and active participants in informal arrangements. The wildlife monitoring NGO
TRAFFIC is a formal partner with CITES under a MoU adopted in 1999 to strengthen capacity
See Frank Biermann et al (2010) ‘Earth system governance: a research framework’, International Environmental
Agreements, 10 (4) 277-98 at pp. 282-4.
46 Benedicte Bull, Morten Bøås and and Desmond McNeill (2004) Private sector influence in the multilateral system:
a changing structure of world governance?, Global Governance, 10 (xx): 481-98 at p. 493
47 Richard Z. Donovan (2010) Private sector forest legality initiatives as a complement to public action, (Richmond: Rainforest
Alliance), p. 3.
48 Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (2002) ‘Private authority as global governance’ in Thomas J.
Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall (eds) The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p. 203.
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building, communication and liaison among member states. This relationship now includes
TRAFFIC acting as a mandated collection point for data from Parties (on the killing of elephants
for example) and a formal requirement for TRAFFIC to report its analysis to each CITES
Conference of Parties. NGOs are partners with governments and international organizations in
so-called ‘Track II’ arrangements that address various aspects of forest crime and illegal trade,
such as the Asia Regional Partners' Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC) and
the International Network on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE).
The dependence on private as well as public spheres of action, and the frequent blurring
of the two, is also reflected in the extent of undercover and intelligence gathering operations
undertaken equally by key NGOs as by national and international enforcement and policing
agencies such as Interpol and the World Customs Organisation. NGOs such as the
Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), TRAFFIC and the Wildlife Conservation Society
(WCS) have developed extensive capacity and expertise in undercover investigation and
intelligence gathering. The EIA describes its own work as involving ‘[d]iligent, carefully planned
undercover investigations’ that generate ‘credible intelligence and persuasive imagery’. 49 This
includes ‘setting up false front companies and well-researched fake identities … to infiltrate
potentially criminal organisations’.
The challenges of agency beyond the state
Agency for transnational forest governance and transnational forest law enforcement spans the
boundary between environmental protection, in which non-state agency is increasingly accepted,
and the making and implementation of rules on crime prevention, enforcement and border
protection over which sovereign states claim and seek to retain individual and collective
authority. The involvement of NGOs in regulatory and governance arrangements such as legality
verification raises questions about independence, autonomy and state sovereignty. Those
questions become even more important when agency beyond the state is extended into the realm
of compliance and enforcement. As Green et al note, the use of surveillance and undercover
techniques – more often associated with national and transnational crime enforcement agencies
– raises questions about the legitimacy and authority of non-state actors whose actions are not
specifically sanctioned by law or regulation. 50 Those issues are explored briefly in this final
section.

See http://www.eia-international.org/about-eia; accessed 25 March 2013; see also
http://science.time.com/2012/04/09/indonesia-punishes-wildlife-traffickers/;
50 Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 100.
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In simple terms, transnational environmental crime in general and timber trafficking in
particular could be understood as a problem of the kind of regulatory failure that occurs when
there is insufficient regulation, or when regulatory systems are based on outdated or insufficient
knowledge, or when domestic agencies ‘inadequately fulfill their oversight, supervisory and
enforcement functions’. 51 Yet there is little agreement on whether LV is best undertaken by
independent agencies or whether the involvement of non-state actors is a stepping stone to
greater involvement of the public sector as procedures improve and as capacity and expertise
grows. NGOs may function independently of the state in their monitoring and verification role.
They may also act on behalf of the state. Private or non-state actors can help to give credibility to
standards. Given that timber trafficking and other forms of environmental crime are serious
crimes that are often not taken seriously by governments, with enforcement in particular usually
vastly underfunded, there is a danger though that NGO capacity and expertise becomes a
substitute for state action rather than a driver of it. Government actors themselves may come to
rely on intelligence gathered through NGO undercover actions. EIA investigators report being
asked by Indonesian forest officials to conduct further investigations because they (the officials)
needed more information that there were apparently unable or unwilling to pursue themselves. 52
Non-state actors can also face challenges in balancing externally-mandated inspectorate
or monitoring responsibilities and their own missions that focus on exposure and enforcement.
This is particularly so in situations where the former relies on improving compliance with
existing rules and regulatory structures and the latter involves challenging and exposing the
limitations of the same rules and regulations. Global Witness, for example, has worked to expose
corruption in the forestry sectors in countries such as Cambodia (from which it was
subsequently banned) and Malaysia at the same time as it has been funded by the UK
government agency DFID (Department for International Development) to work with local
NGOs in a number of forest-producing countries to improve transparency and monitoring with
the explicit goal of driving national and international advocacy to ‘demand accountability and
improve policy and practice across the forestry sector’. 53
The state’s sovereign claims to ‘exclusive competence’ over forest governance, as over
environmental governance more generally, are being re-envisioned by transnational challenges
Daniel Kaufmann and Veronika Penciakova (2011) Preventing nuclear meltdown: assessing regulatory failure in Japan and
the
United
States,
Opinion
(1
April),
Brookings
Institution;
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/01-nuclear-meltdown-kaufmann
52 See http://www.eia-international.org/wb_15_forests; in other areas of transnational environmental crime – such
as wildlife crime – NGO representatives report being present at official interviews of crime suspects (see
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/world/asia/notorious-figure-in-animal-smuggling-beyond-reach-inlaos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
53 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Funding-opportunities/Not-for-profit-organisations/Governanceand-Transparency-Fund/GTF-programmes/Global-Witness-led-GTF-programme/
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and by the nature of agency beyond the state. For Karkkainen, this constitutes more than a
constraint on the exercise of state sovereignty. Rather it implies the ‘partial disaggregation or
unbundling and reassignment of powers traditionally thought to be among sovereignty’s most
essential attributes’. 54 There is, as a result, no clarity on whether the involvement of NGOs in
forest regulation, governance and enforcement is a challenge to sovereignty, a function of weak
sovereignty, or whether it can actually serve to strengthen state capacity. To some extent, the
involvement of NGOs can be seen as a response to the inadequacies and incapacities of the
state, with NGOs filling the gaps in environmental/forest sector governance where states have
been unwilling or unable to do so. However, agents beyond the state do more than ‘assist’ the
state, or attempt to influence state policy, or step in when state capacity is found wanting. Rather
this agency also exists as a sphere of politics and authority independent of the sovereign state i or
what Rosenau refers to as ‘sovereignty-free’ zone. 55 The involvement of NGOs in both
regulation and enforcement in the global forest sector can also be understood as a countervailing
force, a ‘disciplining of state agencies’ 56 or what Tinker refers to as a ‘check and balance on
unbridled state sovereignty’ 57 of the kind that arises when agents of the state are complicit in the
very issues and challenges – such as illegal logging and associated trade – that they purport to be
attempting to solve.

Bradley C. Karkkainen (2004) “Post-sovereign environmental governance”, Global Environmental Politics 4 (1): 72-96
at p. 77
55 James Rosenau (1990) Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
56 Green et al, ‘Logging and legality’, p. 100.
57 Catherine J. Tinker (1993) 'NGOs and environmental policy: who represents global civil society?', paper presented
to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, p.14.
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